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Ex 86-0334

0086-0444

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

14 FEB 1986  
OCA 86-0444

The Honorable Don Edwards  
Chairman  
Subcommittee on Civil  
and Constitutional Rights  
Committee on the Judiciary  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am replying to your letter of January 28, 1986 to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning personnel security investigations.

The Central Intelligence Agency was not involved in the "lesson plan" or "classroom hand-out" materials which your letter indicates were used by a Department of the Army polygraph training school before their use was ordered discontinued. The Agency recognizes that personnel security investigations can, by nature, appear to be intrusive. Nonetheless, the Agency works to insure that all such investigations under its jurisdiction are properly conducted and inquire only into those areas which involve legitimate security concerns.

Personnel security investigations are, of course, only one part of the Agency's personnel security program. The purpose of this program is to insure that all persons hired and retained by the Agency possess the extremely high degree of trustworthiness required to deal with this nation's most sensitive national security information. Determinations of trustworthiness are, however, not made in a vacuum. They hinge, instead, on the particulars of each case. Further, the sorts of information which may be required to reach a determination of trustworthiness in a particular case and the means by which that information is assembled can involve some of the most sensitive intelligence sources and methods information which the Agency possesses.

Your letter requests that the Agency furnish a witness to testify, among other things, on the relationship "demonstrated through a scientifically valid method" between the sorts of issues raised by the Army materials and a "proclivity to commit



espionage". Because of the Agency's view that determinations of trustworthiness cannot be made in a vacuum, the Agency does not believe that a general discussion on the subject would be particularly useful, especially a discussion which had as its reference criteria not generated by the Agency and apparently discontinued by the Army. Further, were the discussion to turn to specific sources and methods used by the Agency, I fear that it would fall within an area, intelligence oversight, which has been committed to the jurisdiction of the intelligence committees. It is for these reasons the Agency is reluctant to provide a witness as described in your letter.

Let me, however, suggest the following. If, at the time the Subcommittees' proceedings in this matter have been completed you still believe the record needs supplementation, the Agency would be willing to discuss with your staff the possibility of providing, in an appropriate format, written supplementary materials.

I hope that this is responsive to your letter. A copy of this letter is also being forwarded to Chairwoman Schroeder.

Sincerely,

~~SIGNER~~

David D. Gries  
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

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Misc. Pers.

1 - PS Signer

LEG/OCA: [ ]jb (13 Feb 1986)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

14 FEB 1986

OCA 86-0444/1

The Honorable Patricia Schroeder  
Chairwoman  
Subcommittee on Civil Service  
Committee on Post Office and  
Civil Service  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Madam Chairwoman:

I am replying to your letter of January 28, 1986 to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning personnel security investigations.

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Sincerely,

~~SECRET~~

David D. Gries  
Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
**ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC		X		
11	IG		X		
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL	X			
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS		X		
16	VC/NIC				
17	D/Security		X		
18	C/Secom		X		
19	DER				
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		SUSPENSE 15 Feb 86			
		Date			

Remarks

TO #13: Please prepare an appropriate response.

Executive Secretary


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Date

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**Congress of the United States**  
**House of Representatives**  
**Washington, DC 20515**



January 24, 1986

The Honorable William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Mr. Casey:

In December, the Pentagon ordered the Army's polygraph training school to cease use of a lesson plan and classroom hand-out on personnel screening because of the inappropriate material they contained. Some of the questions suggested for use were:

- Have you ever consulted a psychiatrist?
- Have you ever thought of committing suicide?
- Have you ever experimented with the use of drugs?
- Have you ever associated with persons addicted to the use of drugs?
- Do you sometimes use alcoholic beverages to excess?
- Has any member of your family ever been an alcoholic?
- Have you ever been tempted to steal from an employer?
- Are you a name dropper?
- Do you belong to an ethnic club or group?
- Have you ever purchased any anti-American books?
- Do you believe you have any homosexual tendencies?
- Have you ever been a party to an abortion?
- Do you believe in background security investigations?

The lesson plan also says that membership in labor unions, the NAACP, political organizations other than the two major national political parties, or the Jehovah's Witnesses could be proper areas of inquiry during a background investigation. The material also says that any homosexuality should be pursued but that "occasional sexual 'flings' are to be expected."

We are writing to you because your agency conducts personnel security investigations. Many of the personal characteristics on which the DoD polygraph manual focused are also the subject of inquiries by personnel security investigators. In connection with hearings we plan to hold on the issue of personnel security investigations, we would like to know who could testify on behalf of your agency on the relationship between the types of issues listed above and the proclivity to commit espionage.



S-108-IR

Hon. William J. Casey  
January 24, 1986  
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
In order to build a useful hearing record, we would like a witness who can testify on the nexus, demonstrated through a scientifically valid method, between the types of behavior described above and espionage. Moreover, if your agency has determined that any of the subject areas listed above are inappropriate for inquiry, we would like to know the basis on which you made such determination.

We would appreciate hearing from you by February 15, 1986.

Sincerely yours,



DON EDWARDS  
Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil  
and Constitutional Rights,  
Committee on the Judiciary



PAT SCHROEDER  
Chairwoman, Subcommittee on  
Civil Service, Committee on  
Post Office and Civil Service